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INTRODUCTION
Trial publicity has been an issue since the early days of the Republic. 1 The concern at its core involves a balancing between protecting the right to a fair trial and safeguarding the right of free expression. 2 Trial publicity also implicates important societal interests such as the free dissemination of information, especially concerning the public interests in knowing of threats to safety and information generally concerning judicial proceedings and the public policy involved. 3 In adopting the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"), the American Bar Association's ("ABA") has sought to balance these interests. 4 To that end, Model Rule 3.6 limits the public communications of attorneys during an investigation or litigation. 5 Highprofile cases are most likely to involve concerns under Rule 3.6.6 One such case is that of David Hicks of Australia, who was captured in December 2001, in Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance. 7 Hicks was among the first detainees transferred to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 8 the first such detainee to be assigned a military defense attorney, 9 and the third detainee to be charged. 10 Soon after being appointed as defense counsel for Hicks, United States Marine Corps Major Michael Mori called a press conference at which he denounced the military commission as incapable of granting his client a fair and impartial trial. 11 This Note will focus on two extrajudicial statements made by Major Mori. Specifically, this Note will analyze the sources and scope of his ethical responsibilities and whether or not those two extra-judicial statements violated these responsibilities. Part I provides a description of Model Rule 3.6 and its competing purposes, as well as a description of the military trial publicity rules.'2 Part II provides a brief history of the military commissions for the Guantanamo detainees and discusses the military commission of David Hicks. Part III analyzes Major Mori's extrajudicial statements under Model Rule 3.6, Navy Rule 3.6, and the various rules specific to practice in military commissions. 13 Part IV concludes that Major Mori's statements did not violate Model Rule 3.6 and that sanctions against Major Modi for any potential violation under Navy Rule 3.6 or the military commission rules may run afoul of the Constitution. Every military attorney is required to be admitted to a state bar, and military attorneys are subject to both the ethical requirements of their respective state bars and their respective military services. 1 The following discussion considers these rules as they relate to trial publicity.
A. MODEL RULE 3.616
Model Rule 3.6 includes a general rule against trial publicity, but strives to strike a balance among the interests of the defendant, the attorney, and the public. According to Model Rule 3.6(a):
A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.17
The Rule governs the conduct of lawyers who are involved or have been involved in an investigation or litigation, and includes in this group 16. The ABA's Model Rules are not binding on attorneys unless adopted by their state bar and promulgated by the highest court in the state. The author does not know what state bar Major Mori is licensed by, and no attempts were made to discover that information in the interests of keeping the analysis at a more general level. While every attorney practicing before the military commission is subject to the military commission rules and every military attorney is subject to their respective service's rules, only a small number of attorneys will be subject to the same particular state bar rules. This is because of the few numbers of military attorneys working in military commissions, and because those military attorneys can be licensed in any of the states or territories of the U.S. Additionally, a majority of the state bar rules are substantially similar to Model Rule 3.6. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1068 n. 1 (1991) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citing the degree to which states have adopted Model Rule 3.6-16 states verbatim and 11 states with minor modifications).
17. MODEL RULES R. 3.6(a).
lawyers in the same firm or government agency. 18 Model Rule 3.6 only prohibits extrajudicial statements when the lawyer "knows or reasonably should know"'1 9 that 1) the information will be publicly communicated and 2) "will have a substantial 20 Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may state:
(1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved; (2) information contained in a public record; (3) that an investigation of a matter is in progress; (4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation; (5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto; (6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and (7) in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6):
(i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused; (ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person; (iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and (iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation.
MODEL RULES R. 3.6(b). 23. MODEL RULES R. 3.6 cmt. 5. The text of the improper subjects includes:
(1) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness; (2) in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or Finally, Comment 6 considers the importance of the nature of the proceeding in determining whether extrajudicial statements will prejudice the proceeding, finding criminal jury trials to be the most sensitive to extrajudicial statements. 24 Model Rule 3.6 does contain an exception for extrajudicial statements made to 2 protect a client from undue prejudicial effect of adverse publicity. This exception requires that: (1) the adverse publicity was not initiated by the lawyer or client; (2) a "reasonable lawyer" would believe a statement is required to protect the client from "substantial undue prejudicial effect;" and (3) the statement is limited to the information necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity. 26 Rule 3.6 addresses a number of competing interests, most notably a balance between a defendant's right to a fair trial and an attorney's right to free expression.27 The rule is based on the following three grounds.
First, a defendant's right to a fair trial is threatened when the 28 impartiality of the decision-maker is threatened. One of the ways that a decision-maker can be improperly influenced is by being presented in a
29
public forum with information that is not admissible at trial. Such publicity can essentially serve as an end-run around the evidentiary requirements of a fair trial and the requirement that a verdict or judgment contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure to make a statement; (3) the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented; (4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration; (5) information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and that would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or (6) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.
MODEL RULES R. 3.6 cmt. 5. 24. MODEL RULES R. 3.6 cmt. 6. 25. MODEL RULES R. 3.6(c) ("Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity."); see also MODEL RULES R. 3.6 cmt. 7.
26. MODEL RULES R. 3.6(c be based on the record at trial. 30 Generally, the concern is greater with respect to a jury trial than a bench trial, because judges are seen as more immune to extrajudicial influences and because they often make exclusionary decisions on evidence that they likewise are required to discount.31 Some ABA commentators, however, have concluded that even judges and prosecutors may not be able to maintain neutrality in the face of sustained media pressure.32 Because of the greater constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants, preventing trial publicity is even more critical in criminal trials.
33
Second, the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression is implicated whenever the government limits expression. 34 Model Rule 3.6 limits what an attorney can say outside of the courtroom. 35 In a divided opinion, the Supreme Court in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada36 held that the substantial likelihood of material prejudice test created an appropriate balance between an attorney's freedom of speech and the State's interest in fair trials. 37 The Court also held that, as interpreted by the Nevada Supreme Court, Rule 177 was void for vagueness. 38 In a highly publicized case, Gentile, a defense attorney, called a press conference the day after his client was indicted on criminal charges under Nevada law. 39 In that press conference, Gentile attacked the motivations of the prosecutors and claimed the detective was more likely to have committed the crimes 37. Id. at 1076 (Rehnquist, C.J.) ("While supported by the substantial state interest in preventing prejudice to an adjudicative proceeding... the Rule is limited on its face to preventing only speech having a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing that proceeding.").
38. Id. at 1048 (Kennedy, J.).
As interpreted by the Nevada Supreme Court, the Rule is void for vagueness, in any event, for its safe harbor provision, Rule 177(3), mislead petitioner into thinking that he could give his press conference without fear of discipline. Rule 177(3)(a) provides that a lawyer "may state without elaboration.., the general nature of the ... defense."
Id.
39. Id. at 1063 (Rehnquist, J.).
charged. 40 The statements appeared in local newspapers, and a local jury trial took place approximately six months later. 4 1 After Gentile's client was acquitted on all charges, the Nevada state bar disciplined Gentile for his extrajudicial statements.
42
Finally, Model Rule 3.6 also addresses the social interest in the release of information about trials to the public. 43 Specifically, Comment 1 highlights the public's right "to know about threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring its security."' 44 Additionally, the comment points to a public interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings, especially when those proceedings have "direct significance in debate and deliberation over questions of public policy.'' 4 B. ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE RULE 3.6
In addition to the ethical obligations imposed by their respective state bars, military attorneys are also subject to the rules of professional conduct 46 of their respective service.
After the adoption of the Model Rules in 1983, and the subsequent adoption of similar rules in many states, the armed services confronted differing ethical standards for its attorneys licensed in any one of fifty-four different jurisdictions. 47 In light of conflicting ethical duties and given the unique nature of the practice of law in a military context, the armed services created their own rules of A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable per-son would expect to the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter. their list of permissible statements, the two services provide the same basic six types of permissible statements as in Model Rule 3.6(b), but make the list more restricted by adding the qualifier "without elaboration" after "a lawyer . . . may state . . . ." Second, for their list of impermissible statements, both services include an additional seventh type of impermissible statement for those that relate to "the credibility, reputation, motives, or character of civilian or military officials of the Department of Defense.'58 Finally, the Navy's 2004 amendments to its rules included a change to the text of its list of impermissible statements to add the parenthetical "(including before a military tribunal or commission)" after "a criminal matter" for when a statement is likely to have a prejudicial effect.
59
The services also differ from each other in terms of the exception for mitigating adverse publicity 60 and from Model Rule 3.6 in terms of additional protections for information.61 First, the Navy provides an exception to the general rule in 3.6(d) that is substantially similar to the 62 Model Rule 3.6(c), while the Army includes no such exception to its rule. 63 Second, both services add a provision to Rule 3.6 to highlight that other laws and regulations govern and may further restrict what information can be released as well as who may release that information.
64
Because state bar rules and military service rules differ, conflicts will inevitably result. 65 Conflicts are resolved by giving primacy to the service-specific rules over the rules of the licensing authority for conduct in the course of official responsibilities for the military attorney. 66 Given the likely similarity of the two sets of rules when applied, the difference in practice may actually be more one of interpretation.67 Cases involving 57. Compare MODEL RULES R. 3.6(b), with ARMY RULES R. 3.6(c), and NAVY RULES R. 3.6(c).
58. See ARMY RULES R. 3.6(b)(7); NAVY RULES R. 3.6(b)(7). Army Rule 3.6(b)(7) limits this provision with a second sentence stating "[t]his does not preclude the lawyer from commenting on such matters in a representational capacity" and provides an example in the comment of an "administrative hearing where such matters are relevant." ARMY RULES R. 3.6(b)(7); see ARMY RULES R. 3.6 cmt. The Navy Rule 3.6 does not contain either the language in the second sentence or any discussion of Rule 3.6(b)(7) in the comment. NAVY RULES R. 3.6(b)(7); see NAVY RULES R. 3.6 cmts. (holding that military lawyers working in close proximity to opposing military counsel and a military lawyer serving as counsel when the prosecutor, investigating officer, or judge exercises command authority over the lawyer are improper). In this same decision, the Committee determined that in certain circumstances, situations arising in a military context would lead to allowing actions that would not be acceptable in a civilian court.
Id.
69 The Commission process has been created and controlled by those with a vested interest only in convictions.'"84 Major Mori complained specifically about rules that disallowed tribunal judges from dismissing charges and the lack of appeals to civilian courts. 5 He also raised the concern that the tribunals themselves might lead adversary nations to use the same process on U.S.
86
soldiers or contractors serving abroad. Although the media claimed that someone had filed a complaint about these statements, no information is available about who filed the complaint and what, if any, action was taken as a result. 8 7 The Navy did, however, subsequently revise its rules of professional conduct in November of 2004, including a revision to its trial publicity rule.
88
Major Mori has not spoken about the details of the conduct of his client or any evidence that he has seen, limiting his attacks to the unfairness he perceives in the process and the alleged mistreatment of his client. 89 94 The military commission rules present two additional policies relating to trial publicity: prohibition on disclosure of protected information and regulation of statements to the media. 95 First, the prohibition on disclosures of protected information applies to all military commission defense counsel and prohibits improper disclosure of "classified information, national security information, or state secrets to an Accused or potential Accused or to any person not specifically authorized to receive such information. " 96 Second, the military commission rules provide that the sole release authority for DoD information is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, and that any defense counsel member may only communicate with the media about cases or other military commission matters with the approval of either the Appointing Authority or the General Counsel of DoD. 97 In case of a conflict between the military commission rules and those of the service or bar jurisdiction, the Appointing Authority can only apply the military -commission rules after coordination with the conflicting service and/or bar jurisdiction. While not the focus of this Note, a number of civilian attorneys also represent David Hicks before the military commission. 99 These civilian American and Australian attorneys face a different set of ethical obligations. 100 While civilian attorneys practicing in tribunals conducted pursuant to the Manual for Courts-Martial or the Uniform Military Code of Justice ("UCMJ") may be suspended from such practice for violation of the applicable service rules, 10 1 the military commissions are conducted pursuant to Military Commission Order 1 ("MCO-I") under which service rules do not apply to civilian defense attorneys.1°2 To participate in a military commission, however, civilian defense attorneys for detainees are required to "sign[] a written agreement to comply with all applicable regulations or instructions for counsel, including any rules of court for conduct during the course of proceedings."' 0 1 3 While certain portions of military commission proceedings may be closed to both the Accused and civilian defense counsel, the military defense counsel may not be excluded from any trial proceeding.' 0 4 Within the context of the Hicks military commission, however, this is not likely to be an issue because the U.S. conceded in an agreement with the Australians that the prosecution did not intend to rely on closed proceedings in its case-in-chief.1 0 5
III. THE EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENTS AND THE ETHICS RULES
Major Mori is subject to the ethics rules of his state bar, the Navy, and the military commissions. 10 6 Therefore, his extrajudicial statements must be analyzed under these rules. 100. Commission rules allow civilian attorneys to represent detainees at no cost to the government if they meet certain requirements, including signing an agreement to be bound by the military commission rules. MCO-1, supra note 70, ¶ 4(C)(3).
In light of the text and purpose of Model Rule 3.6, it does not seem likely that Major Mori breached an ethical duty with his extrajudicial statements. 10 7 Certainly, he seems to meet the rule's three-part test triggering the trial publicity prohibition: he is a lawyer involved in the litigation, he made extrajudicial statements related to that litigation, and he reasonably knew the information would be publicly disseminated. 1 0 ' While the preceding requirements are almost certainly met here, both types of statements are likely to fail the substantial likelihood test when measured against the three aids to interpretation provided in Model Rule 3.6.109
First, looking at the permissive statements provided in Model Rule 3.6, the criticism of the military commission process and personnel involved could potentially be considered part of the defense or even information contained in a public record.11 0 The allegations of abuse of his client could also be considered part of the defense involved. 111 It is also possible, however, that other claims of abuse were already part of the public record because of allegations made by others who have discussed the alleged abuse, such as Hicks himself or his father.112 While Hicks claims to have made the allegations to the International Committee of the Red Cross both in Afghanistan and in Cuba, it is unclear whether any allegations of abuse were made public before Major Mori made the allegations of abuse.' 1 13 Second, looking at the list of impermissible statements provided in the comment to Model Rule 3.6, neither type of extrajudicial statement seems to fit within the list."1 4 Although the allegations of abuse might qualify as "information that the lawyer knows . . . is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and that would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial,""' the standard for admitting evidence in the military commissions is extremely broad, as any evidence that "would have probative value to a reasonable person" is generally admitted. 116 Finally, looking at the type of proceeding involved, this case is probably subject to the highest concern for regulation by Model Rule 3.6.118 The military commission trial of David Hicks is best characterized as a criminal trial, especially since a finding of guilt could result in imprisonment up to a life sentence. 119 In addition, the presiding officer has mang, of the attributes of a judge and the panel members are similar to a jury.12 While this case presents the highest concern for the rule, the two statements are unlikely to be found to pose a substantial likelihood of material prejudice because they can be reasonably characterized as part of the defense, and it is unclear that such information would be inadmissible in a military commission.121
Even though Major Mori's statements do not appear to fall under the general rule,' the exception to the general rule of Model Rule 3.6 may 123 provide an additional justification for the extrajudicial statements. This exception recognizes that ensuring a fair trial may require the defense to respond to trial-related negative publicity of the defendant initiated by the prosecution or by a third party.124 Neither of Major Mori's statements, however, is likely to fall within the exception because Major Mori did not offer them to mitigate adverse publicity.
Looking to the underlying interests of free expression, a fair trial, and 125 public information protected by Model Rule 3.6, Major Mori's extrajudicial statements do not seem to violate the rule. His client, after all, has a right to a full and fair trial. 12 6 In this case, there does not seem to be an inherent conflict between the defendant's trial rights and the attorney's first amendment rights. Instead, the interests of both seem to point in favor of the extrajudicial statements. Also, the public interest here in knowing information about the commission process, especially any 117. See Austrl. Radio, supra note 87. While it may seem obvious that any statement made to Australian media would be picked up quickly by American media, the author did not find that that was the case. In fact, specific details about Major Mori's statements were often only available through Australian media sources. Evaluating Major Mori's statements against the more stringent requirements of the Navy Rules may result in a different, and controlling, result. The analysis of the general rule is the same as that under Model Rule 3.6 above. The substantial likelihood test, however, is bolstered under the Navy Rules because the statements critical of the military commissions personnel seem to fall squarely within the additional impermissible statement of Navy Rule 3.6(b).129 Specifically, Major Mori's statements critical of the military commission personnel both refer to "a criminal matter (including before a military tribunal or commission)" and relate to "the credibility, reputation, motives, or character of civilian or military officials of the Department of Defense," which is impermissible under Navy Rule 3.6(b)(7 134 This impermissible type of statement is unique to the Army and Navy Rules, although the Army provides a qualifying statement that allows such comments in a representational capacity.' 35 Navy and Marine Corps attorneys are the only attorneys practicing before a military commission subject to this preclusion of their speech without an exception. 136 It is unclear why criticism of any DoD official would materially prejudice a criminal tribunal, and the comment to the rule provides no explanation for this exceptional and broadly-worded provision. 137 The type of statement precluded does not appear to relate directly to the concerns which the Navy's trial publicity rule seeks to balance-the defendant's right to a fair trial, the attorney's right to free speech, and the public's interest in judicial proceedings. 138 Further, any sanction imposed on this ground is likely to be found void for vagueness because of the high risk of discriminatory enforcement given the facts of this case. 139 Here, as in Gentile, the comments were in a "political forum" and "directed at public officials and 14 Without that limitation, refusing to grant approval to make extrajudicial statements may be seen as a violation of free speech. 148 This restriction on speech may also implicate Major Mori's ability to fulfill his ethical duty to "defend the Accused ... zealously within the bounds of the law . . . .149 In any case, pursuing sanctions for any such violation is likely not only to raise constitutional and ethical concerns, but also policy considerations. Any sanction of Major Mori's statements is likely to weaken, rather than strengthen, the U.S. and international perception of the fairness and impartiality of the military commissions. Because none of the Guantanamo detainees are American citizens and they are being held outside the United States, the international community has an interest in the judicial process for the detainees in addition to the American public. Actions taken to silence or punish this speech will likely be seen as an effort to conceal issues in the system, and the perceived cover-up may be seen as worse than any alleged unfairness in the military commissions.
CONCLUSION
Major Michael Mori, detailed defense counsel for Australian detainee David Hicks, has made at least two sets of extrajudicial statements that have resulted in concerns of potential ethical violations. Specifically, Major Mori publicly criticized the Department of Defense officials involved with military commissions as being interested only in convictions. 150 Additionally, he made allegations that David Hicks had been abused while detained directly to the Australian government and press.151 Major Mori faces a myriad of ethical obligations arising from his his state bar,'52 the Navy, and the military commissions. First, under Model Rule 3.6, neither of his statements meets the substantial likelihood test required of the general rule even under a higher concern provided that the trial is similar to a criminal trial. Second, under Navy Rule 3.6, his first statement probably violates a provision unique to the Navy that makes criticism of any DoD official an impermissible type of statement, but that provision does not seem to belong in a trial publicity rule and is not likely to survive constitutional scrutiny. Third, under the military commission rules, any potential sanctions for a possible violation concerning a lack of prior permission to speak to the media may face constitutional, ethical, and political barriers. Finally, the fundamental interests that underlie all of the trial publicity rules of a defendant's right to a fair trial, an attorney's right to free speech, and the public's right to information about judicial proceedings all seem to line up in favor of the extrajudicial statements in this case.153 While the substance of his public comments may continue to earn him criticism for any number of reasons, Major Mori's extrajudicial statements do not seem to merit sanction with respect to any of the trial publicity or military commission rules.
